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"[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of
a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last:
judicial inquiry is complete."'
I. INTRODUCTION

With the implementation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) came the implementation of

*
**

Chief Judge Emeritus, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Florida.
Law Clerk to the Honorable A. Jay Cristol, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge.

1. In re Randle, No. 07C631, 2007 WL 2668727, at *5 (N.D. 111.July 20, 2007) (quoting
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).
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the means test as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). BAPCPA's "means
test" is Congress's ill-conceived attempt to curb abuse in bankruptcy cases
by ensuring that those who can afford to repay some portion of their
unsecured debts are required to do so. 2 Prior to the advent of BAPCPA and
its means test, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case could only be dismissed if a
court determined that granting relief under that chapter would constitute
a "substantial abuse." 3 This pre-amendment law established a

2.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 asks the very fundamental question of
whether repayment is possible by an individual. It is this simple: If repayment is
possible, then he or she will be channeled into chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code
which requires people to repay a portion of their debt as a pre-condition for
limited debt cancellation ....This bill does this by providing for a means-tested
way of steering people ... who can repay a portion of their debts, away from
[C]hapter 7 bankruptcy.
151 CONG. REC. S 1856 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley). With all due respect,
by his statement, it is evident that Senator Grassley has failed to recognize what this author, in more
than two decades on the bench, has observed first-hand. Almost all consumer debtors seeking relief
in the bankruptcy court are honest, decent, hardworking citizens who suffered a catastrophic
financial tragedy, seldom of their own making, such as serious medical disaster and no health
insurance, loss of employment, dissolution of a marriage, or some financial mistake or misfortune.
The means test imposes burdensome and onerous filing requirements and provides draconian
penalties for the most minor and insignificant failures to comply with even the most unimportant
statutory requirements.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). Courts determined which Chapter 7 filings amounted to
"substantial abuse" by determining which debtors had unreasonable and unnecessary expenses from
which they could pay some of their debts. See In re Dorwarth, 258 B.R. 293 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2001) (Chapter 7 case dismissed where debtor had ability, after eliminating or reducing certain
unnecessary expenses, including payment for upkeep of retired police horses, to fund a 36-month
Chapter 13 plan that would pay unsecured creditors nearly 100% on their claims). In Dorwarth, this
author cited two different pre-BAPCPA approaches used by the courts to determine what
circumstances would constitute "substantial abuse" under section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code:
One approach focuses on the Debtor's ability to repay debts from future income,
as determined by the Debtor's ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan. See In re Cox,
249 B.R. 29,31 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000); In re Dickerson, 193 B.R. 67,71 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1996) (citing cases from the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals). The other adopts a "totality of the circumstances" approach which
essentially looks to numerous factors relevant to the Debtor's financial planning.
See In re Haddad, 246 B.R. 27, 33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (listing fifteen
factors).

Dorwarth, 258 B.R. at 295. The common thread among the circuits was that if the debtor had the
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"presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.'"
However, under the new provisions of BAPCPA, the pre-amendment
presumption has been replaced and dismissal is now authorized when the
lesser standard of "abuse" can be demonstrated.' Specifically, § 707(b)
limits judicial discretion6 by providing that a court shall presume "abuse"
if the debtor's current monthly income, reduced by certain allowed
expenses, produces a specific amount of disposable income which could
be used to repay at least a portion of his or her unsecured non-priority
debts.7
While some have referred to the test applied under 11 U.S.C. §
707(b)(2) as the "mean" test,' others who have analyzed the test present it

ability to repay even a portion of his debts out of future income, he should not be able to proceed
in a Chapter 7 case. Id. (quoting In re Cox, 249 B.R. at 31).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
5. Id. § 707(b)(1) (2005). Congress was apparently unhappy with how courts were
determining which cases were a "substantial abuse" and therefore created a strict formula for
determining abuse, to wit, the means test. The means test eliminates from the Bankruptcy Code the
former presumption of Chapter 7 availability in favor of the debtor. See id. Some believe that §
707(b)(2) effectively replaces uncertainty and diversity of holdings in the case law determining
"substantial abuse." Karen A. Giannelli et al., Step-by-Step Procedurein a Chapter 7 Case, in
COMM. LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 216-17 (2006). This author disagrees and
believes there exists sufficient precedent set forth in the pre-BAPCPA case law to guide courts, and
inform debtors, in the determination of what "substantial abuse" is. See, e.g., In re Dorwarth, 258
B.R. at 295. But see H.R. REP. No. 109-31 pt. 1, at 12 (2005) (noting that the law is responsive to
concerns that the "substantial abuse" standard for dismissal was "inherently vague" and had led to
"disparate interpretation and application by the bankruptcy bench.").
6. In In re Hartwick,the Minnesota court concluded that Congress essentially locked the
courts out of any discretionary decision on how to apply the means test-taking away all equitable
discretion to help make the Code work effectively:
[C]oncepts of fairness involve equitable principles and judicial discretion.
Congress had neither of these in mind in enacting the means test in 11 U.S.C. §
707(b). The means test presents a backward looking litmus test performed using
mathematical computations of arbitrary numbers, often having little to do with a
particular debtor's actual circumstances and ability to pay a portion of debt.
Congress has already determined the fairness of application of the means test, and
a major objective of the legislation was to remove judicial discretion from the
process.
352 B.R. 867, 870 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 373 B.R. 645 (D. Minn
2007).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2005). However, the means test presumption is not
applicable to debtors whose income is at or below the highest applicable state median family
income. Id. § 707(b)(7)(A)(i).
8. United States Trustee Program: "Watch Dog or Attack Dog?" Hearing Before the

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19

as "an objective, formulaic determination aimed at measuring a consumer
debtor's ability to repay at least some portion of his or her general
unsecured debt over time." 9 Consumer debtors who file for bankruptcy
relief under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 must now file what are referred
to generically as the "means test forms." Although the means test forms
differ depending on the chapter under which a debtor files, the forms
contain required current monthly income calculations and a schedule of
deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). ° The first step in the means test
analysis is to compute an income variable designated as current monthly
income (CMI)," and compare it to state median income figures.' 2 If a
debtor or joint debtors fall below the applicable state median family
income, then no presumption of abuse arises; the debtors "fail" the means
test and are permitted to file under Chapter 7, providing them a safe harbor
free from dismissal for "abuse."' 3

Subcomm. on Administrativeand CommercialLaw of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,110th Cong.
4 (2007) [hereinafter Watch Dog] (testimony of A. Jay Cristol, Chief Judge Emeritus, U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, S. Dist. of Fla.). See also In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2006) ("The means test does not distinguish those who have tried hard from those who have hardly
tried. It is a blind legislative formula ... ").
9. George H. Singer, The Year in Review: CaseLaw Developments Under the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 37, 88 (2007); see
generally Mark A. Neal & Sandra Manocchio, Means Testing: The Heartof BAPCPA, 40 MD. B.J.
26 (2007).
10. "Means test forms" may be obtained from the web site of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/bkforms/index.html (last visited Feb. 18,2008).
11. "Ironically, there is nothing very current about CMI." Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela
M. White, CatchingCan-PayDebtors:Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 665,673 (2005). A debtor's CMI is defined as the average monthly gross income received by
a debtor (and the debtor's spouse in a joint case) in the six month period preceding the bankruptcy
filing. 11 U.S.C. § 101(1OA) (2005). Almost any source of income is included in the calculation
of a debtor's CMI, without regard to whether the income is taxable; but, Social Security benefits
and other narrow categories of income, including payments to victims of terrorism, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity are excluded from CMI. Id. Although the CMI may not accurately reflect
the actual income of a debtor or debtors, "it is the rock on which the means test is built." Culhane
& White, supra,at 674.
12. The median income figures for all states can be obtained at the U.S. Trustee Program web
site, availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/2006100l/meanstesting.htm (last visited Feb.
18, 2008).
13. Mark Jickling, Bankruptcy Reform: The Means Test, CRS Report for Congress, Order
Code RS22058, at 4 (2005). Under § 707(b)(3), the safe harbor does not protect a debtor if a court
or the U.S. Trustee move to dismiss for abuse on non-means test grounds. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)
(2005).
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If a debtor's CMI is above-median, the debtor must next calculate
allowable deductions from CMI.1" If an above-median income debtor has
no disposable income remaining after deducting allowed expenses, the
debtor's case will not be presumed to be an abuse of the provisions of
Chapter 7.5 If, on the other hand, the debtor has disposable income
remaining, the debtor must satisfy a mathematical test found in 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(i) designed to determine the total amount of disposable
income the debtor will produce over the next sixty months which could be
devoted to a repayment plan under Chapter 13, should the debtor choose
to convert rather than have the case dismissed for abuse. 6
Naturally, the more expenses a debtor is allowed to deduct from CMI,
the better the chances are of remaining in a Chapter 7 case.' 7 However, in
the two years since the enactment of BAPCPA, courts are no closer to
agreeing on the appropriate deductions available to debtors. While some
courts adhere to the plain language of the statutes, others, struggling to
achieve Congress's perceived goals of BAPCPA, are ignoring the plain
language and opting to inject legislative history and congressional intent
into their interpretation of the means test provisions to try to make the test
"work better."' 8 This Article focuses on the diverging opinions emerging
specifically from the application of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), and
discusses how some courts, urged by the United States Trustee (UST), are
14. The categories of allowable expenses which may reduce a debtor's CMI are contained in

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (2005). The Congressional Committee Notes on Subpart 5C of
Means Test-Deductions for Debt Payment indicate that Subpart C of the forms deals with the
means test's deductions from CMI for payment of secured and priority debt, as well as a deduction
for administrative fees that would be incurred if the debtor paid debts through a Chapter 13 plan.
Advisory Committee Note to Official Forms 22A, 22B, & 22C, C(3) (2005-2008). In accord with
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), the deduction for secured debt is divided into two entry lines-one for
payments that are contractually due during the sixty months following the bankruptcy filing, the
other for amounts needed to retain necessary collateral securing debts in default. 11 U.S.C. §
707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I)-(II) (2005). In each situation, the instructions for the entry lines require dividing
the total payment amount by sixty, as the statute directs. Id.
15. Neal & Manocchio, supra note 9, at 28.
16. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(I). If, after deduction of all allowable expenses from a debtor's CMI,
the debtor has less than $100 per month in monthly net income (i.e., less than $6,000 to fund a sixty
month plan), the filing is not presumed abusive. Id. If the debtor has between $101 and $166 per
month, the case will be presumed abusive if that sum, when multiplied by sixty [months], will pay
25% or more of the debtor's non-priority unsecured debts. Id.§ 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I).
17. See supra note 13.
18. See Neil P. Olack, Symposium, Consumer Bankruptcy Panel: Selected Hot BAPCPA
Topics, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 517, 522 (2007) (comments by the Honorable Neil P. Olack
regarding those judges who "think they can determine what Congress meant and deviate from the
plain meaning and try to find a rational resolution of whatever the issue is.").
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cheating the means test and denying debtors the full benefits of the plain
meaning of the statute. This Article concludes by suggesting the UST
exercise the discretion given to it by BAPCPA' 9 to decline to file motions
to dismiss or convert and that the courts follow suit by adhering strictly to
the language of the statute.
Section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) provides that the debtor is entitled to deduct
from CMI "the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to
secured creditors. 20 Simply stated, this provision allows a debtor to deduct
from CMI payments the amount the debtor is legally obliged to make
under a contract. Although the language of the statute appears to be
"plain"'" and simple, courts have disagreed over whether the statute allows
a debtor to deduct from CMI secured debt for property the debtor intends
to surrender, and in some cases actually does surrender. Some courts allow
a debtor to include among the means test's secured debt expenses the debts
on property the debtor intends to surrender.22 Other courts conclude just the

19. "BAPCPA vests in the [UST] the responsibility to review each presumptively abusive
case and the discretion to determine whether a motion to dismiss for presumed abuse is
appropriate." Neal & Manocchio, supranote 9, at 28-29. Under 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1)(A), if a case
is identified as presumptively abusive, the UST must file a statement of presumed abuse within ten
days after the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors. Within thirty days after filing a statement
of presumed abuse, the UST must "file a motion to dismiss or convert under section 707(b) or file
a statement setting forth the reasons the [UST] . . . does not consider such a motion to be
appropriate." 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2) (2005).
20. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). The amounts to be deducted are not the actual monthly
payments due under the relevant contracts but rather the "average" monthly payments "calculated
as the sum of... the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each
month of the 60 months following the date of the petition." Id. The statute also provides as follows:
(II) any additional payments to secured creditors necessary for the debtor, in filing
a plan under [Clhapter 13 of this title, to maintain possession of the debtor's
primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the support of
the debtor and the debtor's dependents, that serves as collateral for secured debts;
divided by 60.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II).
21. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (stating that the plain
meaning of the statute controls unless the literal application of the statute produces 'a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."') (citation omitted).
22. See, e.g., In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May
1, 2006); In re Randle, 358 B.R. 360 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 2006), aff'd. No. 07C631, 2007 WL
2668727 (N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007); In re Longo, 364
B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007); In re Mundy, 363 B.R. 407 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007); In re
Kelvie, 372 B.R. 56 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007); In re Benedetti, 372 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).

11 US.
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opposite.23
II.

"PLAIN MEANING" INTERPRETATION OF

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)
A court's starting point in construing a statute "is the existing statutory
text., 24 "It is well established that 'when the statute's language is plain, the
sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition required by the
text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms."25 "As long as the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for
a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute. ' 26 "A statute is
not ambiguous . . . merely because it is susceptible to varying
interpretations., 27 "'The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used and the broader context of the statute as a
whole. "'28
The earliest case to assess the plain meaning of 11 U.S.C. §
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) is In re Walker.29 In Walker, Chapter 7 debtors included
in their means test calculations a deduction for the average monthly
payments on property they intended to surrender at the time of filing.3" The
UST filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the debtors should not be allowed
to deduct from CMI an expense that they have no intention of paying in the
future. 3 1 The Walker court disagreed with the UST and allowed the
deduction. It applied the "plain meaning" rule in interpreting the statute

23. See, e.g., In re Skaggs, 349 B.R. 594 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006); In re Harris, 353 B.R. 304
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006); In re Love, 350 B.R. 611 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006); In re Crittendon, No.
06-10322C-13G, 2006 WL 2547102 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2006) (noting the application of
§ 707(b)(2) is different in a Chapter 13 case than in a Chapter 7 case); In re Ray, 362 B.R. 680
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2007).
24. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).
25. Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1,
6 (2000)). "When no specific definition for a term is given in the statute itself, [courts should] look
to the ordinary common sense meaning of the words." "'Absent clearly expressed legislative intent
to the contrary, the language is regarded as conclusive."' Watson v. Ray, 192 F.3d 1153, 1156 (8th
Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
26. In reAm. Steel Prod., Inc., 197 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11 th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States
v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
27. In re Wilkins, 370 B.R. 815, 819 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007).
28. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
29. No. 05-15010, 2006 WL 1314125 (N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006).
30. Id. at *5-6.
31. Id. at *2, *6.
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and determined that the common meaning of the words "scheduled as
contractually due" is "those payments that the debtor will be required to
make on certain dates in the future under the contract."3 The court stated
that "nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that the
scheduled payments remain contractually due."3 Significantly, the Walker
court held that the date of the filing of the petition is the applicable date on
which to determine all allowances as the statute requires a determination
of "how many payments are owed under the contract for each secured debt
at the time of filing., 34 Because the Walkers were contractually obligated
to make payments on the date they filed their bankruptcy petition, the
deduction from CMI was allowed.
Other courts have followed the Walker court's lead.35 Although these
cases vary slightly in their reasoning, they all conclude that the term
"scheduled as contractually due" includes payments that will not be made
post-petition on surrendered property. Moreover, the plain meaning of the
term "does not lead to an absurd result."36 Whether the word "scheduled"
is given its "dictionary meaning of 'to plan for a certain date' or...
intended to reflect debts listed in [the debtors'] '[s]chedules[,]' the
qualifying words "'contractually
due' make[] the differing definitions of
' scheduled' insignificant." 37 As long as a debtor is obligated under contract
to make regular monthly payments on secured debt, those payments are

32. Id. at *9.
33. Id. at *13. The Walker court explained that surrender did not eliminate the debtors'
contractual obligations; "[alt the earliest, it may be eliminated by the entry of the discharge." Id.
at *12.
34. 2006 WL 1314125 at *11. As the Kelvie court stated,
an approach to the issue focusing on post-petition events defeats the function of
the means test as an objective, formulaic analysis at the time of the filing of the
petition. The means test in Chapter 7 calls for a snapshot, not a movie. Tying the
analysis to events occurring after bankruptcy... is inconsistent with the language
and overall structure of the means test.
In re Kelvie, 372 B.R. 56, 62 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (distinguishing itself from the court in In re
Singletary, 354 B.R. 455 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) which was constrained in its opinion by preBAPCPA precedent set under In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2006), in which the Fifth Circuit
held that post-petition factors determine whether a debtor is entitled to deduction for collateral the
debtor intends to surrender). Accordln re Benedetti, 372 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (instead
of looking at how the debtor's finances progress over time, the means test takes a snapshot of the
debtor's finances on the petition date).
35. See supra text accompanying note 22.
36. In re Wilkens, 370 B.R. 815, 819 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007).
37. Id.

11

US. C § 707(b)(2)(A)(iiQ: DOES IT MEAN WHAT ITSAYS AND SAY WHAT ITMEANS?

"'contractually due' from the debtor on the petition date."38 A statement of
intention to surrender secured property does not alter the "legal obligation
to make the payments as it existed on the petition date."3 9
The Walker court's reasoning and plain meaning interpretation of the
statute accomplish the broader goals of the means test-fairly applying a
straightforward formulaic equation to all debtors equally. The plain
meaning interpretation emphasizes the fact that the means test does not
impose limits on the deduction of secured debt payments.4" There is also
"no express requirement that the collateral be necessary or the amount of
the debt be reasonable"; 4 and, there is no limitation on the time of
acquisition of the secured property.42 Moreover, there is no conditional
language in § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) which requires that a debtor must intend to
continue to pay the contractually due amounts to claim the expense, and a
debtor's intent to surrender collateral does not alter the contractual
obligations.4 3
This section of BAPCPA specifically addresses secured debt payments,
not general expenses, and "contains no limitations on the secured debt
deduction, other than that the projected expenses" must actually exist at the
time of filing.'
If Congress intended to limit secured debt payments contractually
due from debtors on the petition date to those where actual future
payments will be made in Form B22C calculations, it knew how to

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers
Under the "BankruptcyAbusePrevention andConsumerProtectionAct of2005," 79 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 191, 201, 224 (2005). The deduction for secured claims is not limited to those debts which
would be paid in a hypothetical Chapter 13 case. Id."The unlimited secured debt deduction bought
the support of home mortgage lenders, and, when Congress threw in limits on cramdown in
[Cjhapter 13, got the automobile industry on board as well." Culhane & White, supra note 11, at
676 (citing Richardo I. Kilpatrick, ConsumerBankruptcy Reform Roundtable, 7 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 3, 12-13 (1999)).
41. Culhane& White, supranote 11, at 676. The omission ofthese limits appears intentional
as the next sentence following allows an additional deduction of cure payments, expressly limited
to those cure payments that are necessary to retain possession of a few crucial assets (i.e., principal
residence and motor vehicle needed for the debtors and dependents). Id.
42. Id. The unlimited deduction appears "to invite last-minute purchases for those who need
more deductions from CMI to pass [(or more appropriately, "fail")] the means test." Id.
43. See In re Randle, No. 07C631, 2007 WL 2668727, at *5-6 (N.D. 111.July 20, 2007).
44. See Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living With the Means Test, 31 S. IL. U.
L.J. 463, 492 (2007) (the secured debt deduction rewards the debtor who has larger amounts of
secured debt).
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do so, as reflected, for example, by the inclusion of the terms
"actual monthly expenses" and "actual expenses" elsewhere within
section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) and (1l)."'
Thus, it appears from the plain language of the statute that Congress eased
the means test to serve goals other than just the maximum repayment for
unsecured creditors; it sought "to create a 'mechanical' formula for
presuming abuse of Chapter 7."46
III. "LEGISLATIVE INTENT" ANALYSIS

Notwithstanding the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii),
some bankruptcy courts attempt to derive the intent of Congress from the
scant legislative history and impose additional obligations not statutorily
required. These courts are urged on by the UST to conduct individualized
inquiries into each debtor's intent and individual circumstances-which
is precisely47at odds with Congress's purpose of creating a mechanical
means test.
For instance, in In re Skaggs, the UST filed a motion to dismiss.48 The
UST argued that if the debtor does not intend to make installment
payments on his secured debt, he should not be permitted to take the
deduction under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii). 49 The UST reasoned that such
interpretation accomplished the goal of BAPCPA to repay as much debt as
is possible.5° The Skaggs court agreed with the UST and found the debtor's
Statement of Intention, coupled with his pre-petition decision to cease
payments and use of his mobile home and post-petition failure to object to
the lift of the stay against it, presumptively precluded that secured debt
from being an "applicable" expense.5 ' The Skaggs court focused on the
language "scheduled as contractually due," and concluded that the
Bankruptcy Code was not referring to the common dictionary meaning for
the word "schedule" but rather whether the debt was identified on debtor's

45.
2006).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

In re Oliver, No. 06-30076RLD13, 2006 WL 2086691 at *3 (Bankr. D. Or. June 29,
2006).
In re Randle, 358 B.R. 360, 363 (N.D. Ill.
See In re Hartwick, 359 B.R 16, 21 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2007).
In re Skaggs, 349 B.R.594, 595 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.2006).
See generally id.
Id.at 595-98.
Id.at 598.
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bankruptcy schedules.52 Using this definition of "scheduled," the court
opined that, if the debtor's schedules and statements show that the debtor
will not be making the payment on a secured debt in each of the sixty
months following the date of the petition, the secured payment may not be
appropriately deducted on the means test.53
The problem with this position is that it requires revising the means test
calculus to take post-petition events into account, to look forward at what
is to come.54 This holding also assumes Congress had only one goal behind
implementing BAPCPA, that is, having debtors who can pay do so. That
is not the case, however. Congress, in enacting the means test, also set
forth a mechanical procedure for identifying abuse through a very specific
formula to calculate a debtor's income and expenses.55 A mechanical,
standardized means test reduces a court's discretion in deciding whether
to dismiss a case for abuse. 6 Thus, although BAPCPA was intended to
weed out those debtors who could repay a portion of their debts, the means
test was also enacted to create a uniform and mechanical method for
determining a certain level of "abuse," without regard to an individual's
actual circumstances.57 The UST, and the courts, cannot and should not

52. Id. at 599-600.
53. In re Skaggs, 349 B.R. at 600.
To focus on the single term "contractually due" without due consideration of the
import of the term "scheduled" and the phrase "in each of the 60 months following
the date of the petition" will miss the actual meaning and the intent of§ 707(b)(2).
A primary intent of Congress in the passage of BAPCPA was to ensure that those
debtors who can pay their debts do so.
Id.
54. See Tabb & McClelland, supra note 44, at 493; see also In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785, 791
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2007) ("The best interpretation of § 707(b)(2) is to regard it as requiring a
'snapshot' of the debtors' finances at the time of filing."); In re Kelvie, 372 B.R. 56, 62 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2007); see generally Benedetti, 372 B.R. at 90 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
55. In re Randle, No. 07C631, 2007 WL 2668727, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2007) (citing In
re Mundy, 363 B.R. 407, 413 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007)).
56. Id.
57. In re Wilkins, 370 B.R. 815, 819-20 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007).
It is a mechanical test that requires the debtor to assume as expenses certain IRS
standards, rather than using the actual expenses of the debtor in these categories.
Congress could not have meant the means test to present an accurate, realistic
picture of a debtor's income and expenses or it would have chosen a different
vehicle to conduct the test. If the language which formulates the means test must
be strictly followed in doing the form B22A calculations in all other regards, than
the language of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) should be similarly strictly followed.
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elevate one legislative purpose-having debtors who can pay do
so-above another-the standardized application of the means test,
especially when that is not supported by the plain language of the statute.5"
IV. "PLAIN MEANING" RATIONALE VS. "LEGISLATIVE
INTENT" RATIONALE

One advantage to the plain meaning interpretation of the statute is that
"it creates a zone of certainty."59 "[I]t means what it says" and it is safe for
all-judges, attorneys, creditors, and debtors-to rely on it.06 Adherence
to the plain language rationale avoids the possibility that a court will
import "unsuspected qualifications or implications into the text, even if
these qualifications or implications were probably intended by the
legislature."'6' The emphasis on the plain meaning of the text, rather than
on the legislative intent, ensures the law is applied equally and with
certainty to the public as a whole and that all have fair notice of the
prerequisites of the law.62
While a court's fidelity to legislative intent has certain advantages,
namely, advancing democracy by furthering the intentions of the elected
representatives of the people,63 it is also fraught with problems. It gives
"priority not to the apparent meaning of the text, but to the meaning it was
intended to have."' However, as in the case of BAPCPA, there is scant
legislative history from which to draw proper inferences on what Congress

Id.
58. Randle, 2007 WL 2668727, at *9.
59. See Ruth Sullivan, The Plain Meaning Rule and Other Ways to Cheat at Statutory
Interpretation, Legal Drafting, University of Ottawa, http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-resulliv/legdr/pmr.
html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
60. Id.
61. Id.; see, e.g., In re Skaggs, 349 B.R. 594, 598-99 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006) (rejecting the
Walker court's dictionary definition of the word "scheduled" to conclude that payments that are
"scheduled as contractually due" are those payments that the debtor will be required to make on
certain dates in the future, the Skaggs court found that the debtor's schedules and statements form
the basis from which the court should determine whether a debt is "scheduled as contractually due"
despite the fact no such requirement exists in the plain text of the statute).
62. See Sullivan, supra note 59.
63. See id. at 4-5 ("[F]or law to be legitimate it must be democratic, and for law to be
democratic it must be made by the elected representatives of the people.... Judges do not make
law; they only apply it. Being impartial and unbiased, they use their legal interpretation skills to
discover and give effect to the intention of the legislature.").
64. Id.
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intended.65 Moreover, where there may be "errors" in the text, adherence
to legislative intent in an effort to correct the errors and bring the text in
line with the meaning actually intended by the legislature is inappropriate.
Such judicial interpretation, to cure a perceived legislative oversight, is
essentially "a form of amendment and an impermissible encroachment on
the legislative sphere." The BAPCPA was intended to lock the courts out
of any discretionary decision on how to apply the means test-taking away
all equitable discretion to help make the Code work effectively.67
Courts which inject legislative history into a statute as plainly written
as 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), a statute that is neither ambiguous nor
absurd in its plain meaning, cheat debtors out of the benefit of proceeding
under Chapter 7 when they are truly worthy of relief.6" In addition to the
onerous and burdensome requirements imposed by the plain language of
BAPCPA,69 the arbitrary nature and extent of interpreting the law in light
of legislative text and history further hinders a debtor's ability to obtain a
"fresh start" in bankruptcy. Such interpretation, fostered by the UST's
policy arguments, makes no exceptions for the honest but unfortunate
debtor. For example, if a debtor's income, averaged over the last six
months, is too high to "fail" the means test when, in fact, the debtor lost
his or her job and his or her income is zero, no legislative intent is
expressed to make an exception. If an expense element on the "means" test
65. Legislative text and legislative intention are incomplete sources of law. Id.
66. Id.at 17.
67. Supra text accompanying note 6.
68. See supra text accompanying note 2. The result: "honest people become homeless.
Families are broken up. The victims lose their jobs because they have no car to drive to work."
Watch Dog, supra note 8, at 4; see also infra note 72.
69. As it is written,
[d]ebtors must obtain all "payment advices" for the 60 days before the bankruptcy
is filed; they must obtain a tax return or transcript for the most recent year before
the petition is filed ... they must provide bank statements to the trustee and
evidence [of] other current income; they must attend a pre-petition credit
counseling briefing, no matter how hopeless their situation and regardless of
whether their problems were caused by imprudent credit decisions or unavoidable
financial catastrophes; attorneys must complete numerous additional forms,
including a six-page means test form that requires arcane calculations about which
there are many different legal interpretations. According to the [UST] program,
attorneys must also provide clients with pages and pages of so called
"disclosures," many ofwhich are either irrelevant to the client's case or inaccurate,
which then requires much additional time spent explaining why they are irrelevant
or inaccurate.
Watch Dog, supra note 8, at 4.
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is higher than the actual number, the UST has the "chutzpah"' to ignore
the statutory calculation and urges courts to use the actual number.7'
"[T]he problems of consumer debtors are only exacerbated by the
aggressive anti-consumer stance of the [UST] program."72
The independent decisions of career personnel and local offices
have been subordinated to central directives from a politicized
central office dedicated to serving the political interests of the
administration-in this case, by effectively becoming an arm of the
administration's corporate backers in the financial services industry
and trying to make bankruptcy as difficult and unattractive as
possible.7
"[S]pending enormous resources [in] going after minor document defects
in papers filed by consumer debtors... has done nothing to address the
70. "Chutzpah" means the quality of audacity, for good or for bad. The word derives from
a Hebrew word meaning "insolence," "audacity," and "impertinence." The modem English usage
of the word has taken on a wider spectrum of meaning, however, having been popularized through
vernacular use, film, literature, and television. See also LEO ROSTEN, THE JOYS OF YIDDISH 92-93
(1968) (defining "chutzpah" as "[g]all, brazen nerve, effrontery, incredible 'guts'; presumptionplus-arrogance such as no other word, and no other language, can do justice to"). Mr. Rosten
provides the classic definition of "chutzpah" as follows:
Chutzpah is that quality enshrined in a man who, having killed his mother and
father, throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is an orphan.
Id. In addition to the foregoing law-themed definition, there is another legal chutzpah story that
begins with a man going to a lawyer and asking:
"How much do you charge for legal advice?"
"A thousand dollars for three questions."
"Wow! Isn't that kind of expensive?"
What's your third question?"
"Yes, it is.
Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Essay: Lawsuit,Shmawsuit, 103 YALE L.J. 463,465 (1993) (an
amusing and informative essay shedding light on the use of Yiddish in the English vernacular).
71. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 374 B.R. 353,362 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (according to the plain
meaning ofthe statute and the carefully reasoned case law, the Local Standards deduction is a fixed
allowance). See also Jickling, supra note 13.
72. See Second Anniversary of the Enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumers Protection Act of 2005: Are Consumers Really Being Protected Under the Act?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, I I0th Cong. 7 (2007) (testimony of Henry J. Sommer, President, Nat'l Ass'n Of
Consumer Bankr. Attorneys).
73. Id. at 7-8.
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widespread fraudulent claims and charges of mortgage companies in
bankruptcy ..... and other creditor abuses.74
Bankruptcy courts should not succumb to the arbitrary policies and
unfair methods employed by the UST,75 and they should resist injecting
their interpretation of legislative intent into statutes that are plainly
worded.76 Such statutes mean what they say and say what they mean.
Courts should adhere to the plain meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)
and let the chips fall where they will.
If 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) means what it says and says what it
means, then surely the "Gander Rule" should apply. The courts and the
UST are bound to enforce a fictitious calculation of income upon debtors
who may not have any income whatsoever.77 What is good for the goose
is good for the gander. Fairness requires that, if the debtor is penalized by
the fiction of the statute as to income, then the debtor is also entitled to any
benefit the debtor may receive by the application of the fiction to the
debtor's expenses. Perhaps a better means test could have been enacted,
requiring use of actual income and expenses, but Congress chose fiction
over fact, and it is the function of the courts to apply the statute as enacted.

74. Id. at 8. Most documents filed by debtors' attorneys are not as poorly and inaccurately
prepared as the unsupportable documents filed in great profusion by creditors-yet the UST spends
little or no time on creditor wrongdoing. Id.
75.
It appears that the [UST] sees its mission to deny people relief through
bankruptcy. They file dismissal motions for minor defects, which makes things
especially difficult forpro se debtors. The [UST] should be helping not hindering
these people. Dismissal motions filed for things like credit counseling a few days
early, or one or two missing pay stubs, when it is obvious that such omissions are
of no significance.
Watch Dog; supra note 8, at 5.
76. "The decision to replace fact-based inquiry with a rigid, mechanical test in [C]hapter 7
is adequately, in fact unmistakably, evidenced. The means test requires use of CMI, a retrospective
view of income, and standardized expenses." In re Littman, 370 B.R. 820, 829 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2007). The means test is "essentially an eligibility test, a mechanical construct designed to restrict
judicial review of the debtors' financial picture when arriving at a 'presumption' of abuse. It does
not contain any provision which permits a court to review the debtors' actual finances or to discount
their secured debt." In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2007).
77. Supra text accompanying note 57.
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